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Abstract
We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in a com-
mittee with members of both common and conflicting interests. We show that the set
of preferences that allow for the existence of an informative voting equilibrium can
be heavily restricted by the presence of a public signal, regardless of the size of the
committee and the choice of the voting threshold value. What’s worse, the presence
of the public information introduces an inefficient equilibrium which robustly exists
across different voting rules. To mitigate the harmful effect of the public information,
we propose to use a class of more flexible voting rules, whose threshold values de-
pend on both the precision and the realization of the public signal, that may restore
the informative voting equilibrium. In particular, in a standard setting with common
interest agents, the contingent voting rule that we construct not only always restores
the informative voting equilibrium but also achieves full informational efficiency.
Keywords: strategic voting, collective decision-making, public information,
committee design, optimal voting rule.
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1 Introduction
A common argument for voting mechanisms is that they help aggregating the informa-
tion that agents in a committee privately hold, and thus lead to better decisions compared
to the case of a single decision-maker. Indeed, as the celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem
(CJT) suggests, in a standard setting where agents have common interest, under the ma-
jority voting rule even strategic agents will find it optimal to simply vote informatively,
and the private information dispersed among the committee members is efficiently ag-
gregated (Condorcet, [1785] 1994; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996). However, Kawamura
and Vlaseros (2014) (henceforth KV) make the interesting observation that, as long as
there exists a public signal that can be commonly observed by all agents and that is supe-
rior to each of their private signals, the majority rule can no longer lead to an equilibrium
in which all agents just vote according to their private signals. What’s worse, the pres-
ence of the public signal opens the possibility for agents to coordinate on the obedient
voting equilibrium, in which everyone just votes according to whatever the public signal
suggests and thus completely disregards the private information. Quite likely, this could
be very inefficient since the public signal is rarely perfect. Experimentally, KV find that
a large proportion of subjects in the laboratory behave quite consistently with what the
obedient voting equilibrium would predict, and the outcome of the collective decision
almost always coincides with that in an obedient voting equilibrium.
This observation is highly relevant, because it should be clear that the access to both
private and public information for the voters is the rule rather than the exception: in
business, members in the board of directors receive (or even ask) advice from the advi-
sory board of the company; in a court, a witness states his/her testimony in front of all
members of the jury; the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which
has only seven members, often invites renowned scholars in the relevant fields to give
short presentations when important decisions that affect the well-being of more than 1.3
billion people are needed to be made. If in the end only the public information counts,
why should we bother to use the voting mechanism in the first place?
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In this paper, we first take this observation one step further. We study the effect of
the public signal in a richer setting where agents have both common and conflicting in-
terests: while agents share the common goal of making a collective decision that will be
matched to the state, they may have different payoffs from the different types of deci-
sion errors that could occur. This allows us to see how the presence of a public signal,
even if it is less accurate than any of the private signals, limits the existence of the in-
formative voting equilibrium, in which every agent simply votes according to her private
signal. More specifically, we show that whenever the public signal is superior to each
agent’s private signal, the informative voting equilibrium does not exist for any k-voting
rule (which includes the majority rule as a special case) and any preference profile of the
agents. Moreover, even if the public information is less accurate than the private informa-
tion, the set of preference profiles that allow for informative voting under some k-voting
rule is strictly smaller than it would be in the absence of the public signal: for example,
if the public signal is just slightly less precise than the private signal, under the standard
majority voting rule the informative voting equilibrium only exists if all agents are suf-
ficiently unbiased ex ante. Therefore, we substantially generalize KV’s result to arbitrary
precision of the public signal, a larger class of voting rules and a richer set of preferences
of the agents.
We then provide a solution to tackle the harming effect of the public signal. We show
that by using a class of more flexible voting rules of which the threshold values depend on
the realization of the public signal, existence of the informative voting equilibrium can be
restored for a large range of preferences (in particular, when all agents are unbiased). We
call such voting rules contingent k-voting rules. Compared to the corresponding standard
k-voting rule that would sustain informative voting as an equilibrium if the public signal
were absent, the appropriately chosen contingent k-voting rule requires less votes for the
committee to select the alternative suggested by the public signal. Thus, in the informa-
tive voting equilibrium, an agent knows that she is decisive only if the private signals
of the others are collectively more against the decision suggested by the public signal,
which helps eliminate her incentive to deviate from informative voting. For any prefer-
ence profile of the agents, we provide a simple algorithm to find the contingent k-voting
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rules that can be used to restore informative voting. We show, for the important limiting
cases where agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned (but not necessarily unbiased), that
such contingent k-voting rules always exist, provided that the size of the committee is
sufficiently large.
Finally, we discuss the welfare properties of the contingent k-voting rules. We provide
a sufficient condition under which the informative voting equilibria under the contingent
k-voting rules are asymptotically efficient. Moreover, we prove that in a standard setting
where agents have pure common interest, under the contingent majority rule (which can
be obtained by adjusting the threshold value in the standard majority rule to be depen-
dent on the public signal in a symmetric way) the informative voting equilibrium not
only always exists, but also maximizes the expected probability of the collective decision
being matched to the state, given all the information that is available in the committee.
This suggests that with well-designed voting procedures, not only the harming effect of
the public signal can be overcome, but also higher efficiency can be achieved compared
to the benchmark case where agents have no access to any public information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the model. In Section 4 we discuss how the presence of a public signal may
significantly limit the existence of an informative voting equilibrium. We show in Section
5 how to restore the existence by using a class of voting rules that are contingent on the
public signal, and how the use of such voting rules can enhance informational efficiency.
Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on strategic voting since the seminal paper of Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996). Many of the papers in this line of literature study how infor-
mational efficiency of various voting mechanisms is affected by the agents’ strategic be-
havior (see, for example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) on simultaneous voting rules
and Dekel and Piccione (2000) on sequential voting rules). Among all of them, the most
closely related paper besides KV is actually Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). In one sec-
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tion of the paper (pp. 41-43) they extend the standard voting model to the case with both
public and private information, and they conclude that in such a setting sincere voting
cannot be both informative and rational (p. 42, Theorem 3). While this to some extent al-
ready implies the difficulty of information aggregation in a voting game with both private
and public information, it does not address the question of existence of an (individually)
informative voting equilibrium. Moreover, it is not immediately clear what drives this
impossibility result, because in the benchmark case without public signal, each agent has
access to only one private signal, while in the extension there are two instead, which both
enlarges the set of equilibria and makes the information that an agent can draw from piv-
otality less straightforward. Therefore, neither the results in our paper nor in KV follow
directly from Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). In addition, our paper considers a much
richer set of preferences of the agents, which allows us to investigate how the existence
result changes with respect to the changes of the precision of the public signal and the
preferences of the agents.1
Several papers study the effect of pre-voting deliberation (e.g., Coughlan, 2000; Austen-
Smith and Feddersen, 2006; Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). In these models, agents can com-
municate their private information before the vote actually takes place, thus public in-
formation endogenously arises. Our model differs from them in at least two main aspects.
First, in the models with deliberation, conflicts between an agent’s private signal and the
public signal usually do not matter because the former has already been incorporated in
the latter. In the current paper, however, such conflicts have a direct effect on agents’ pro-
vision of private information, which can lead to a severe loss of informational efficiency.
Secondly, unlike in the obedient voting equilibrium in the current paper, in these mod-
els it is actually socially efficient for the agents to always follow the public information,
conditional on their private information being credibly revealed in the deliberation stage.
Finally, there is a third strand of literature on committee design and optimal voting
rules. For example, Persico (2004) studies the optimal size and threshold value for simul-
taneous voting rules when agents’ private information is endogenous. Subsequently, Ger-
1A few other papers also study the effect of public information in a voting environment, e.g., Gersbach
(2000), Taylor and Yildirim (2010), Tanner (2014). However, both the models and the focus of these papers
are quite different from ours.
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shkov and Szentes (2009) show that when information is costly, the optimal direct mech-
anism can actually be implemented by a random, sequential reporting/voting scheme,
which suggests in general that the use of more flexible voting rules can be welfare-
enhancing. This insight is also shared by Gersbach (2004, 2009), who shows that al-
lowing the voting rule to depend on the proposal to be determined may yield efficient
outcomes for classic social choice problems such as provision of public projects and di-
vision of limited resources among agents. More recently, Gershkov et al. (2014) show
that in an environment where agents have single-crossing preferences, a successive vot-
ing rule with a descending threshold achieves the highest utilitarian efficiency among all
anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms. Our
paper contributes to this line of literature by showing that in a setting where both private
and public information exists, efficiency can also be significantly enhanced by using more
flexible voting rules that are contingent on the public information.
3 The Model
3.1 Players, actions and payoffs
Consider a committee of n members (agents) indexed by i ∈ I = {1, ...,n}. We assume n is
odd and n ≥ 3. Agents need to make a collective decision d ∈ D = {0,1} over a binary set of
alternatives. For concreteness, one could think of a setting in which a board of directors
is choosing between two business proposals.
Each agent can cast a vote to support one of the alternatives. We denote vi = 1 if agent
i votes in favor of the decision d = 1, and vi = 0 otherwise. We further denote Vi = {0,1}
as agent i’s action set and v = (v1, ...,vn) ∈ V = Πni=1Vi as the agents’ voting profile. A
collective decision rule is a function, g : V → D, that assigns every voting profile to a
collective decision. In this paper, we restrict our attention to a class of collective decision
rules called k-voting rules. Formally, if we set the alternative associated with d = 0 as the
default option, under a given k-voting rule the alternative associated with d = 1 will be
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chosen if and only if there are at least k ∈ {1, ..,n} votes in favor of it:
g(v) =

1 if
∑n
i=1 vi ≥ k,
0 otherwise.
Each k-voting rule is uniquely characterized by its threshold value k. If k = (n + 1)/2,
we are in a setting of simple majority voting, while k > (n + 1)/2 corresponds to some
super-majority rule.
With equal probability, the state of the world θ is drawn from a binary set Θ = {0,1}.
In the context of the board of directors and business proposals, one could think of θ as
the uncertain (relative) quality of the two proposals, where θ = 1 means the proposal
associated with d = 1 is of higher prospective revenue, while the other is better if θ = 0.
We assume agent i’s utility function ui : D ×Θ → R takes the following form (see also
Coughlan, 2000; Kojima and Takagi, 2010; Iaryczower and Shum, 2012):
ui(d,θ) =

0 if d = θ,
−qi if d = 1,θ = 0,
−(1− qi) if d = 0,θ = 1,
where qi ∈ [0,1]. In words, we assume the agents in the committee have common interest
in matching the collective decision to the state (i.e., choosing the proposal of higher qual-
ity), and we normalize the payoff of successfully choosing d = θ to zero. However, we
allow the agents’ payoffs to differ when committing different types of decision errors (i.e.,
(d,θ) = (1,0) or (d,θ) = (0,1)). We also allow these differences to be heterogeneous across
agents. Note that in our setting, each agent’s utility function is uniquely characterized by
the parameter qi , which is a measure of how biased agent i is towards the default option
ex ante: if qi = 1/2, agent i is unbiased and indifferent between the two alternatives; if
qi < 1/2, agent i is inclined to choose d = 1; however, if qi > 1/2, agent i would prefer
d = 0 if there is no further information to be revealed. In addition, if qi , qj , the two
agents i and j may strictly prefer different alternatives even when they have exactly the
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same information. Hence, we interpret qi , qj as a conflict of interest between the two
agents. We will call the vector q = (qi)i∈I the preference profile of the agents.
Note that, given the above specification of payoffs, if agent i assigns a posterior prob-
ability pi ∈ [0,1] to the event θ = 1, she would prefer d = 1 over d = 0 if and only if
−(1−pi)qi ≥ −pi(1− qi)⇐⇒ pi ≥ qi ,
that is, whenever the evidence of the state being 1 is sufficiently strong.
3.2 Information structure and timing
Before casting their votes, each agent receives a binary, private signal si ∈ Si = {0,1}.
The private signals are i.i.d. across agents and are drawn according to the conditional
probability distribution Pr(si = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(si = 0|θ = 0) = α. In addition, all agents
commonly observe a public signal sp ∈ Sp = {0,1}. The public signal is independent of the
agents’ private signals and is drawn according to the conditional probability distribution
Pr(sp = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(sp = 0|θ = 0) = β. In the context of the board of directors and
business proposals, one can think of the public signal as the opinion expressed by the
advisory board to all directors before the vote takes place. We call α (β) the precision or
the informativeness of the private (public) signal. Without loss of generality, we assume
α,β ∈ [1/2,1]. Denote the signal profile of the voters by s = (s1, ..., sn) and let ms = ∑ni=1 si .
Note that if an agent could observe all the realizations of signals, the posterior probability
that she assigns to the event θ = 1 will be
pi =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)ms ( α
1−α
)n−ms (1−β
β
)1sp=1 ( β
1−β
)1sp=0 . (3.1)
Since the above formula for posterior odds will appear frequently in the results and the
proofs of this paper, we provide its formal derivation in the Appendix.
The timing of the voting game is as follows. First, Natures draws θ. After that, each
agent observes her own private signal and, in addition, the public signal. Agents then cast
their votes, and the collective decision d is determined according to the voting profile and
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the voting rule. Finally, the state is revealed and agents collect their payoffs.
3.3 Strategies and equilibrium
In the voting game, a (pure) strategy of agent i is a function vi : Si × Sp −→ Vi that maps
from the Cartesian product of the private and public signal spaces to the action space. We
are particularly interested in the following two types of voting strategies (see also KV):
Definition 1 A strategy is (individually) informative if vi(si , sp) = si , ∀si ∈ Si , sp ∈ Sp.
Definition 2 A strategy is obedient if vi(si , sp) = sp, ∀si ∈ Si , sp ∈ Sp.
The solution concept we use throughout the paper is Bayes Nash Equilibrium. We call
an equilibrium in which all agents play the informative strategy an informative voting
equilibrium. Similarly, an equilibrium in which all agents play the obedient strategy will
be called an obedient voting equilibrium. For a given preference profile q, if there exists a
k-voting rule under which the informative voting equilibrium exists, we say that such a
preference profile allows for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium or simply
allows for informative voting.
In the absence of public information, if qi ∈ [1 − α,α] ∀i ∈ I , it is easy to check that
under the majority voting rule (i.e., k = (n + 1)/2), the informative voting equilibrium
exists and the CJT holds (Coughlan, 2000). If all agents are highly biased towards one of
the alternatives, a threshold value k , (n + 1)/2 may need to be adopted in order to help
sustaining informative voting as an equilibrium. For example, if all agents are highly
biased towards the decision d = 0 such that qi ∈ [α,α3/(α3 + (1 − α)3)] ∀i ∈ I , one can
show that the informative voting equilibrium still exists in a voting game with the super-
majority rule k = (n+ 3)/2, and the CJT continues to hold as n becomes sufficiently large.
However, as we will see in the next section, if a public signal is introduced to the voting
game, whether it is more informative than the private signals or not, the set of preferences
that allow for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium may shrink drastically.
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4 Impossibility of Informative Voting
In order to show how the presence of a public signal could affect the equilibrium out-
come of the voting game, and in particular how it limits the existence of the informative
voting equilibrium and opens the possibility for agents to coordinate on an inefficient
equilibrium, we first state the following proposition, which characterizes a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium under a given
k-voting rule:
Proposition 1 Given a k-voting rule, the informative voting equilibrium exists if and only if
∀i ∈ I , qi ∈
 11 + (1−αα )2k−n−2 1−ββ ,
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
 . (4.1)
The proof of Proposition 1 is based on two simple observations: first, under a given
k-voting rule, an arbitrary agent i is only pivotal when there are exactly k−1 other agents
who vote in favor of the decision d = 1, while the remaining n − k agents choose to vote
in favor of the decision d = 0; secondly, if agent i prefers to vote according to her private
signal even when it conflicts with the public signal, she will also prefer to do so when the
two signals agree. Assuming all other agents j , i follow the informative voting strategy,
for a given k-voting rule, the left endpoint of the interval in (4.1) is the posterior proba-
bility that a Bayesian agent i will assign to the event θ = 1 conditional on si = 0, sp = 1 and
being pivotal, while the right endpoint of the interval in (4.1) is the posterior probability
conditional on si = 1, sp = 0 and being pivotal. Since a rational agent cares only about the
case in which she is decisive about the final voting outcome, we can conclude that all qi
lying between the above two posterior probabilities is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium under the given k-voting rule.
KV observe that if the public signal is more accurate than each of the private signals
(β > α), informative voting for agents of pure common interest cannot constitute an equi-
librium under the majority rule. The next two corollaries, which follow Proposition 1
immediately, generalize this observation to arbitrary precision of the public signal, the
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whole class of k-voting rules, and a much larger set of preferences.
Corollary 1 Suppose β > α. For any threshold value k and any preference profile (qi)i∈I , the
informative voting equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 2 Suppose β ≤ α. If there exist i, j ∈ {1, ..,n} such that
qi <
1
1 + α1−α
1−β
β
, qj >
1
1 + 1−αα
β
1−β
,
then, for any k-voting rule, the informative voting equilibrium does not exist.
In short, Corollary 1 confirms that whenever the public signal is strictly more precise
than each of the private signals, it is hopeless to obtain the informative voting equilibrium
under any standard k-voting rule. Meanwhile, Corollary 2 implies that even if the public
signal is less accurate, it is still hard to guarantee the existence of the informative voting
equilibrium as long as there are two or more agents who are biased (even just slightly)
toward different alternatives ex ante (note that when β is close to α, both 1/(1 + α1−α
1−β
β )
and 1/(1 + 1−αα
β
1−β ) are close to 1/2).
The intuition behind both corollaries can be understood via the following simple ex-
ample of three agents with heterogeneous preferences, such that
q1 ∈
1−α, 11 + α1−α 1−ββ
 , q2 = 12 , q3 ∈
 11 + 1−αα β1−β ,α
 .
Assume that the collective decision is made according to the majority rule (k = 2). In the
absence of public information, one can check that informative voting constitutes an equi-
librium, even though the first and third agents are biased toward different alternatives
ex ante. Suppose now that the public signal is more informative than each of the private
signals and consider the unbiased agent 2. If agent 2 assumes that the other two agents
will vote informatively, she could infer that the only situation in which she is pivotal is
when agent 1 and 3 receive conflicting signals, but this implies that the others’ private
signals are collectively uninformative about the state. Hence, in this case, agent 2 would
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Figure 1: The graphs of the correspondences Qα,k(β) given n = 3,α = 0.75.
make her voting decision by comparing the observed public signal and her own private
signal, and simply follows the public one because of its higher precision. Now suppose,
conversely, the public signal is less informative than the private signal. While now it is
rational for the unbiased agent 2 to vote informatively (assuming the other two agents
do so as well), this is not the case for the two biased agents. For example, agent 1 will
still strictly prefer to choose v1 = 1 if s1 = 0 and sp = 1, even when she assumes that the
other two agents are voting informatively. This is because the public signal, albeit less
informative, is still in favor of her preferred alternative. Moreover, this problem cannot
be resolved by using the unilateral (k = 1) or unanimity rule (k = 3) instead. For ex-
ample, suppose all three agents are unbiased and the public signal is just slightly more
informative than the private signal. While adopting the unanimity rule can successfully
encourage agents to vote informatively whenever sp = 0, it provides even stronger incen-
tives for the agents to disregard their private information whenever sp = 1.
Figure 1 interprets the above results graphically. Suppose for a given k-voting rule, an
agent i with qi will find it optimal to play the informative voting strategy when assuming
that all other agents j , i are voting informatively. Let Qα,k(β) ⊆ [0,1] denote the set of
all such qi , for given k, α and β. Clearly, for a given preference profile q, the informative
voting equilibrium exists under a given k-voting rule if and only if qi ∈ Qα,k(β), ∀i ∈ I .
Note that, for a given α, Qα,k(1/2) corresponds to the set of preferences that allow for
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informative voting under a given k-voting rule when the public signal is absent. For
fixed parameter values n = 3 and α = 0.75, the top, middle, and bottom part of the gray
area in Figure 1 corresponds to the graph of Qα,3(β), Qα,2(β) and Qα,1(β), respectively.
As the precision of the public signal increases, the measure of each Qα,k(β) decreases. In
particular, when β > α, Qα,k(β) = ∅,∀k = 1,2,3.
Besides shrinking the set of preference profiles that allow for the existence of the
informative voting equilibrium, the presence of the public signal opens the possibility
for the agents to coordinate on playing the obedient voting equilibrium:
Proposition 2 For any given k-voting rule, the obedient voting equilibrium exists if either of
the following two conditions is satisfied:
1. 1 < k < n.
2. k = 1 or k = n, β ≥ α, and ∀i ∈ I ,qi ∈
[
1
1+ 1−αα
β
1−β
, 1
1+ α1−α
1−β
β
]
.
Clearly, the obedient voting equilibrium could be highly inefficient, especially when
the public signal is less accurate or just moderately more accurate than each of the private
signals. In other words, unlike endowing its members with better private signals, intro-
ducing a public signal may actually lead to a worse performance of the committee. This is
similar to one of the most striking findings in the global game literature, namely the het-
erogeneous effect of public and private information. For example, in a highly influential
paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show that in a setting where agents’ actions are strategic
complements, additional public information can have negative social value. Although
agents in the current setting have no intrinsic motive of coordination, our results suggest
similarly that the conventional wisdom that additional information is always beneficial
for decision-makers should be carefully examined.
One might question why agents would coordinate on such an inefficient equilibrium,
especially when it is not unique. In fact, KV prove that if the public signal is more precise
than the private signal and all agents are unbiased, under the majority voting rule there
exist at least two other equilibria with intuitive properties: one is a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium, in which each agent votes according to her private signal with some
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positive probability; the other one is an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, in which
only a small subset of the agents vote obediently while the remaining agents vote infor-
matively. Unfortunately, KV also experimentally show that a very large proportion of
agents tend to vote according to the public signal instead of their private signals much
more frequently than either of the above two equilibria would predict. Consequently, the
collective decisions coincided with what the public signal suggested most of the time. In
other words, the experimental evidence suggests that the presence of a public signal can
indeed lead to a significant welfare loss. An important reason for this inefficient outcome
may be that, compared to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and the asymmet-
ric pure-strategy equilibrium, the obedient voting equilibrium requires conceivably less
sophisticated coordination from the agents. We are therefore interested in the question
whether there exist more complex voting rules that can help restore the existence of the
informative voting equilibrium, which arguably requires even less coordination than the
obedient voting equilibrium. In the next section, we will show that the answer to the
above question is yes if we allow the voting rule to be contingent on the public signal.
5 Reversing the Impossibility
5.1 Contingent k-voting rules
We construct a new class of voting rules that we call contingent k-voting rules, which can
be obtained by adjusting the standard k-voting rules in an intuitive way. In particular,
the threshold values in such voting rules will be no longer fixed but a function of the
realization of the public signal:
k(sp) =

k0 if sp = 0,
k1 if sp = 1,
(5.1)
where k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n}. Any standard k-voting rule amounts to a special case of our con-
tingent k-voting rules.
We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the informa-
14
tive voting equilibrium under a given contingent k-voting rule:
Proposition 3 Given a contingent k-voting rule, the informative voting equilibrium exists if
and only if
∀i ∈ I , qi ∈
[
max{pi00,pi10},min{pi01,pi11}
]
, (5.2)
where
pi00 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 β
1−β
, pi01 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n β
1−β
,
pi10 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 1−β
β
, pi11 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n 1−β
β
.
The proof of Proposition 3 is very similar to that of Proposition 1. The main difference is
that now in the informative voting equilibrium, the information about the other agents’
private signals that an agent can infer from her pivotality depends on the realization of
the public signal. In particular, depending on the choices of k0 and k1, it is no longer
necessarily the case that an agent will have stronger incentives to deviate from the in-
formative voting equilibrium when her private signal differs from the public signal than
when the two signals agree. This is why the interval in (5.2) involves taking the maximum
and minimum of the posterior probabilities that an agent will assign to the event θ = 1 in
different cases.
To see how the contingent k-voting rules can help restore the informative voting equi-
librium, consider a simple example with n = 5 and qi = 1/2,∀i = 1, ...,5. If there is no
public signal, the informative voting equilibrium exists under the standard majority rule.
Now let us introduce a public signal whose informational content about the state is twice
as much as that of a private signal.2 Because the public signal is more informative than
each of the private signals, according to Corollary 1, the informative voting equilibrium
no longer exists for any standard k-voting rule. However, consider the contingent k-
voting rule with the threshold values k0 = 4 and k1 = 2. Assuming all other agents j , i
are voting informatively, if sp = 1, agent i is only pivotal when three of the other agents
2We will formally define the measure of the informativeness of the public signal relative to the private
signal in the next section.
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draw sj = 0 and the remaining one draws sj = 1. Given the above assumption on the infor-
mativeness of the public signal, these private signals are collectively uninformative about
the state when they are combined with the realization of the public signal. Thus, voting
according to her own private signal is a best response for agent i. Similarly, if sp = 0, agent
i is only pivotal under the contingent k-voting rule when there are three private signals
in favor of d = 1 and one in favor of d = 0 among all others’ private signals. Again, the
collective informational effect of all sj , j , i, will be exactly counterbalanced by the fact
that sp = 0, which makes it optimal to vote according to her own signal for agent i.
Intuitively, the public signal introduces a common random shock to all agents’ prior,
which has a very similar effect as a common shock on the preference profile in our model.
As we have seen in Section 3.3, when agents are commonly biased towards one of the two
alternatives, the informative voting equilibrium can still exist if the threshold value k is
appropriately chosen. However, since the shock due to the public signal is random, the
direction of the correction of the threshold value must depend on the realization of the
public signal. In particular, when the public signal is in favor of one of the alternatives,
the threshold value should be adjusted in such a way that this alternative is more likely
to be chosen. At first glance, this might be counter-intuitive because the negative welfare
impact of the public signal, as discussed in Section 4, is exactly due to the problem that
agents are tempted to follow whatever the public signal suggests. However, what we
are doing here is to change the information that agents can infer from pivotality: under
the contingent k-voting rule that is chosen in the above example, whenever an agent is
pivotal, it must be the case that the private signals of the other agents are collectively
more against the alternative favored by the public signal. This restores the incentive for
agents to vote according to their own signals.
5.2 The choice of k0 and k1
We are now interested in the question what would be suitable choices of k0 and k1 if one
wants to restore the existence of the informative voting equilibrium by using a contin-
gent k-voting rule that takes the form of (5.1). Similar to the definition of Qα,k(β), let
Qα,k0,k1(β) ⊆ [0,1] denote the set of qi such that given the precision of the signals α and
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β and a contingent k-voting rule with the threshold values k0 and k1, an agent i with qi
would find it optimal to play the informative voting strategy if she assumes that all other
agents j , i are voting informatively. We first ask what choices of k0 and k1 would lead
to a non-empty Qα,k0,k1(β) for given α and β. To answer this question, we introduce the
following measure of (relative) informativeness of the public signal:
r =
lnβ − ln(1− β)
lnα − ln(1−α) . (5.3)
For given α and β the value of r is uniquely determined, and we will say that the public
signal is r-times as informative as the private signal. For example, if α = 0.6, then β =
0.55,0.69,0.77 correspond to the cases where the public signal is 0.5-, 2- and 3-times as
informative as the private signal, respectively. Note that (5.3) can be rearranged as β/(1−
β) = (α/(1 − α))r . Hence, intuitively, the measure r tells us how many private signals of
opposite realization would counter-balance the informational effect of the public signal.3
We are now ready to state the next corollary, which follows from Proposition 3 and relates
non-emptiness of the set Qα,k0,k1(β) to the relative informativeness of the public signal.
Corollary 3 Qα,k0,k1(β) , ∅ if and only if r − 1 ≤ k0 − k1 ≤ r + 1.
Given the result of Corollary 3, in the remainder of the paper we will focus only on
the contingent k-voting rules with k0 and k1 such that the inequality r −1 ≤ k0 − k1 ≤ r + 1
is satisfied. If r ≤ 1, any pair of integers k0 and k1 such that k0 = k1 or k0 = k1 + 1 satisfies
the above inequality. If 1 < r ≤ n, it is easy to see that there still exists at least one pair
of integers k0 and k1 that satisfies the inequality and leads to a non-empty Qα,k0,k1(β). On
the other hand, for the case r > 1, we know by Corollary 1 that Qα,k(β) = ∅ for any k.
Hence, it is clear that introducing the contingent k-voting rules can strictly enlarge the
set of preferences that allow for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium, as
3Interestingly, (5.3) can be also related to the conditional entropy of θ. Note that the conditional entropy
of θ given the private signal si is H(θ|si) = 1−α lnα− (1−α) ln(1−α), and similarly the conditional entropy
of θ given the public signal sp is H(θ|sp) = 1− β lnβ − (1− β) ln(1− β). Hence, it immediately follows that
∂H(θ|sp)/∂β
∂H(θ|si)/∂α =
lnβ − ln(1− β)
lnα − ln(1−α) .
This gives a formal justification for using r as a measure of relative informativeness of the public signal.
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long as the public signal is not extremely precise (r ≤ n).
When the size of the committee is large, there might be many contingent k-voting
rules whose threshold values satisfy the inequality in Corollary 3. Therefore, for a given
preference profile q it can be very tedious to go through every pair of these threshold
values, and see with which the condition in Proposition 3 will be satisfied. Fortunately,
we can rely on the following algorithm. First, define q = mini∈I qi and q¯ = maxi∈I qi for the
given preference profile. Second, invert the functions pi00 and pi
0
1 of k0 and the functions
pi10 and pi
1
1 of k1 that are defined in Proposition 3. Note that this is feasible because all
these functions are strictly increasing in either k0 or k1. Third, apply the inverse functions
(pi00)
−1 and (pi10)−1 to q¯ and (pi01)−1 and (pi11)−1 to q. Finally, pick an integer that lies in the
interval [(pi01)
−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)] and an integer that lies in the interval [(pi11)−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)],
and we obtain a pair of voting threshold values k0 and k1 that can sustain informative
voting as an equilibrium for the given preference profile.
Note that both (pi00)
−1 and (pi10)−1 are strictly increasing in q¯, while both (pi01)−1 and
(pi11)
−1 are strictly increasing in q. Hence, it is very likely that both of the intervals
[(pi01)
−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)] and [(pi11)−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)] contain no integer if q¯ is sufficiently larger
than q. Intuitively, if the degree of conflict of interest between the agents is too large, it is
very difficult to find a voting rule that ensures the incentive for all agents to vote informa-
tively, even if we allow the voting threshold value to be flexibly contingent on the public
signal. One might therefore expect that it would be easier to find a contingent k-voting
rule that helps restore the existence if the agents’ preferences are more aligned. This is
not true in general because it also depends on the exact values of q and q¯. Nevertheless,
for the important limiting cases where agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned (e.g., Fed-
dersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Persico, 2004; Koriyama and Szentes, 2009), we are able
to prove that there always exists a contingent k-voting rule under which the informative
voting equilibrium exists, as long as the size of the committee is sufficiently large:
Proposition 4 Suppose ∀i ∈ I ,qi = q. There exists n¯(q), such that for each n ≥ n¯(q), there
exists a contingent k-voting rule that can sustain informative voting as an equilibrium.
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k = 2 +1sp=0
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Figure 2: The graphs of the correspondences Qα,k0,k1(β) given n = 3,α = 0.75.
Figure 2 illustrates the main findings of this section graphically. Consider the same
parametric example that we discussed in Section 4, where n = 3 and α = 0.75. Besides
the three standard k-voting rules, we know from Corollary 3 that there are three other
contingent k-voting rules that may lead to a non-empty Qα,k0,k1(β) (depending on the
exact value of r), with the threshold values k(sp) = 1 + 1sp=0, k(sp) = 2 + 1sp=0 − 1sp=1 and
k(sp) = 2 + 1sp=0, respectively. Figure 2 above plots the graphs of the correspondences
Qα,k0,k1(β) for all these contingent k-voting rules. As in Figure 1, the top, middle and
bottom part of the light gray area corresponds to the graph ofQα,3(β),Qα,2(β) andQα,1(β),
respectively. In addition, the graphs of the correspondences Qα,2,1(β) and Qα,3,2(β) are
represented respectively by the top and the bottom part of the deep gray area. Finally,
the dark area corresponds to the graph of Qα,3,1(β). Given a preference profile q and
the precision of the public signal, the informative voting equilibrium can be sustained
by some contingent k-voting rule if and only if all qi lie on a vertical line that is entirely
contained in one of the different segments in the figure. The algorithm that we described
before is just an analytical way for us to find a segment that contains all qi . Comparing
Figure 1 and Figure 2, it is clear that allowing the voting threshold value to be contingent
on the realization of the public signal can help restore the informative voting equilibrium
in many circumstances.
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Interestingly, we observe that for some preference profiles, one can actually induce
the informative voting equilibrium by introducing a public signal of certain accuracy
and using some contingent-k voting rule, even though this would not be possible for any
standard k-voting rule in the absence of the public signal. For example, suppose n = 3
and the agents’ preference profile corresponds to the three dots that lie on the vertical
axis in Figure 2. If there is no public signal, the informative voting equilibrium does not
exist for any fixed k-voting rule, since not all qi are located in the same segment when
β = 1/2. However, it is clear from the graph that when β is sufficiently close to α, all qi lie
on a line that is entirely contained in the top deep gray area, thus the informative voting
equilibrium exists if we adopt the threshold value k(sp) = 2 +1sp=0.
5.3 Welfare analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare implications of the contingent k-voting rules.
This is not a trivial task, because the threshold value in a contingent k-voting rule de-
pends on the realization of the public signal, and it is well-known that different threshold
values can lead to different probabilities of the final collective decision being matched to
the state (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Duggan and Martinelli, 2001).
Since the negative welfare impact of the public signal is due to the inefficient equilib-
rium that it induces, we are first interested in comparing the efficiency of the informative
voting equilibria under the contingent k-voting rules to that of the obedient voting equi-
librium. Intuitively, when the size of the committee is sufficiently large, the information
privately held by the agents must be collectively much more informative about the state
compared to the public signal. Hence, one may expect that the informative voting equilib-
ria under the contingent-k voting rules are more likely to outperform the obedient voting
equilibrium as the size of the committee increases. However, by adding new members
to the committee, both the amount of private information and the degree of conflict of
interest of it may be increased at the same time. The latter effect is problematic because
it may destroy the existence of a contingent k-voting rule that can incentivize the agents
to vote informatively, even if this is not a problem at all for the initial committee. To
avoid this complication, we consider only the type of expansions of the committee that
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do not exaggerate the initial degree of conflict of interest. Formally, let q = (q1, ...,qn) be a
preference profile with q¯ = maxi∈I qi and q = mini∈I qi . We say a sequence of preference
profiles {qs = (qˆ1, ..., qˆn, ..., qˆn+s)}s∈N preserves the conflict of q if ∀qs, maxj∈{1,...,n+s} qˆj ≤ q¯ and
minj∈{1,...,n+s} qˆj ≥ q. For this type of expansions of the committee, the following proposi-
tion provides a sufficient condition under which the informative voting equilibria under
the contingent k-voting rules are asymptotically more efficient than the obedient voting
equilibrium (as long as the public signal is not perfect):
Proposition 5 Suppose α > 1/2. Assume, for a given preference profile q with q, q¯ ∈ (0,1), that
there exists a contingent k-voting rule that can sustain informative voting as an equilibrium.
Then, for any sequence of preference profiles {qs}s∈N that preserves the conflict of q:
(1) ∀qs, there exists a contingent k-voting rule that can sustain informative voting as an
equilibrium.
(2) As s → ∞, the ex ante probability of the collective decision being matched to the state
in the informative voting equilibrium under the corresponding contingent k-voting rule
becomes arbitrarily close to 1.
In the standard setting with pure common interest agents, KV show that if the public
signal is r-times as informative as the private signal, where r ≤ (n − 1)/2, then under the
standard majority rule there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which r∗ = N∩ (r − 1, r]
agents vote according to the public signal, while the remaining n−r∗ agents vote according
to their private signals. This r∗-asymmetric equilibrium is shown to be more efficient than
both the obedient voting equilibrium and the mixed-strategy equilibrium, as well as all
other asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the same voting game. In the following, we
will show that one can always construct a contingent k-voting rule that not only ensures
the existence of the informative voting equilibrium, but also leads to higher efficiency
than the r∗-asymmetric equilibrium in such a setting.
Specifically, consider a contingent k-voting rule with the following threshold value:
k(sp) =

n+1
2 +
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 0,
n+1
2 −
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 1,
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where [(r − 1)/2]+ denotes the smallest integer that is larger or equal to (r − 1)/2. For
convenience, we will call this rule the contingent majority rule. Note that the contingent
majority rule is well-defined whenever r ≤ n. The next corollary, which follows from
Proposition 3, justifies our focus on this particular contingent k-voting rule:
Corollary 4 The informative voting equilibrium exists under the contingent majority rule if
and only if
∀i ∈ I , qi ∈
 11 + (1−αα )|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|−1 ,
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)−|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|+1
 . (5.4)
Note that 1/2 always belongs to the above interval, since |r−2[(r−1)/2]+| ∈ [0,1] for all
r ≥ 0. In other words, for the special case where all agents are unbiased, which is mostly
studied in the literature and, in particular, in KV, one can always use the contingent
majority rule to ensure the existence of the informative voting equilibrium. In fact, for
this case the contingent majority rule is actually the unique contingent k-voting rule that
restores the existence (unless r is an odd integer that is strictly less than n).4 The next
proposition states that the informative voting equilibrium under the contingent majority
rule, if exists, achieves the first-best informational efficiency.
Proposition 6 Given all the available information, the informative voting equilibrium under
the contingent majority rule maximizes the probability of the collective decision being matched
to the state.
To gain some intuition, consider a simple example of n = 5 and r = 2. Assume all
agents are unbiased. Imagine that we introduce two additional phantom agents on top
of the existing five real agents. Moreover, these phantom agents are programmed so that
they simply vote in line with the public signal. Suppose now we use a standard majority
rule to decide which alternative will be chosen. One can easily show that (1) all real
4From the proof of Proposition 4, we know that for given q and r, the contingent-k voting rule that
can be used to restore the informative voting equilibrium, if exists, is unique if and only if either of the
following two conditions is met: (a) q < q¯; (b) both (pi01)
−1(q¯) and (pi11)−1(q¯) are not integers. If q = q¯ = 1/2
and r is an odd integer, both (pi01)
−1(1/2) = (n + r)/2 and (pi11)−1(1/2) = (n − r)/2 are integers. In this case,
there will be four pairs of integers k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n} that satisfy the condition in Proposition 3 if r < n.
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agents voting informatively constitutes an equilibrium in this game, (2) the equilibrium
outcome is identical to that of the informative voting equilibrium under the contingent
majority rule without the phantom agents, and (3) the equilibrium outcome maximizes
the probability of the decision being matched to the state, given all available information.
Intuitively, by allowing the threshold value to be dependent on the public signal and by
encouraging agents to vote informatively, the contingent majority rule aggregates both
the private and the public information efficiently.
On the contrary, in the r∗-asymmetric equilibrium with the standard majority rule,
inefficiency still prevails because there are r∗ agents who always disregard their valuable
private information. To see this issue more clearly, consider again the above example.
Since r∗ = 2, under the standard majority rule there exists an asymmetric equilibrium
in which two agents play the obedient strategy, while the remaining three agents vote
informatively. Without loss of generality, assume the first two agents are the obedient
voters. Consider the signal profile
s = (1,1,0,1,1), sp = 0.
In equilibrium, such a realization of signals will lead to a collective decision d = 0. How-
ever, from a benevolent social planner’s point of view, given all the available information,
the welfare maximizing decision should be d = 1. Therefore, the r∗-asymmetric equilib-
rium is strictly less efficient than the first-best.
We close this section with an important remark about the implementation of the con-
tingent k-voting rules, which is an intuitive yet non-obvious implication of Proposition
6. In practice, it might be difficult to contract a voting rule that is contingent on the
public information, especially when the source of the public information is ambiguous
ex ante. However, if agents have pure common interest, we can instead implement an
arguably more contractible two-stage voting mechanism, in which, after observing the
private and the public signals, the agents first vote about which voting threshold value
k ∈ {1, ...,n} to use and then vote about which collective decision to take. Independent of
the specific procedure of the first-stage voting rule and the off-equilibrium beliefs and
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behaviors that we assume for the agents, in the two-stage voting game there must exist a
Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium that is outcome-equivalent to the informative voting
equilibrium under the contingent majority rule, i.e., an equilibrium in which agents first
collectively vote to agree on the threshold value that would be chosen by the contingent
majority rule, and then they vote informatively in the second stage. The reason being is
that, according to Proposition 6, the expected social welfare is maximized when such a
voting threshold value is in use. Since each agent’s interest is perfectly aligned with the
social welfare, any deviation in the first stage will only yield a lower expected payoff to
an agent.
6 Conclusion
Our paper makes two main contributions. First, we show that the presence of a public
signal may significantly limit the existence of an informative voting equilibrium in a set-
ting where agents in a committee have both common and conflicting interests. It is also
shown that the public signal opens the possibility for the agents to coordinate on playing
an inefficient equilibrium that robustly exists across many different voting rules. Given
KV’s experimental evidence, we believe these two results to be of high policy relevance.
Second, we show that by allowing for more flexible voting rules, of which the threshold
values are contingent on the realization of the public signal, the existence of the infor-
mative voting equilibrium can be restored and the efficiency of the committee can be
enhanced in many circumstances. Generally, the public information in our model can be
interpreted as a random shock to the agents’ common prior. Although it is known that
whether a given voting rule can sustain informative voting as an equilibrium partially
depends on the agents’ prior beliefs about the state (see, e.g., Coughlan, 2000; Laslier
and Weibull, 2010; Ben-Yashar and Nitzan, 2014), to the best of our knowledge, no pre-
vious paper in the voting literature actually assumes a random common prior, let alone
analyzes its implications for the existence of informative voting equilibrium and the effi-
ciency of different voting rules.
In terms of future research, theory-wise, an interesting extension of our model would
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be to drop the assumption that the public information is exogenous and consider it to
be strategically chosen by a public agent who has private interest over the potential al-
ternatives. Some recent papers look at the question how a biased public agent can op-
timally persuade uninformed voters by designing the informational content of a public
signal (Alonso and Caˆmara, 2014; Wang, 2015). The results of the current paper suggest
that even when we allow the voters to have access to some private information, the col-
lective decision can still be heavily influenced by the public agent who has control over
the public information. Experiment-wise, given that in the standard setting with unbi-
ased agents our theory predicts that the contingent majority rule can always ensure the
existence of the informative voting equilibrium and achieve first-best informational effi-
ciency, it would be very interesting to test it in the laboratory and see whether it actually
outperforms the standard majority rule.
In general, our results suggest that in a voting environment where both private and
public information exists, the voting procedures matter and the optimal voting rule should
reflect the information that is contained in the public signal. For example, if the advisory
board indicates that one of the business proposals is more promising than the other, it
might be desirable for the board of directors to set up a voting rule that is more in favor
of the acceptance of that proposal. Nevertheless, the design of optimal decision rules in
more general social choice environments with public information remains an open and
important research question.
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Appendix
Derivation of Equation (3.1)
Conditional on observing the whole profile of private signals and the public signal, the
posterior probability that a Bayesian agent would assign to the event θ = 1 is given as
follows:
Pr(θ = 1|s, sp) =
Pr(θ = 1,s, sp)
Pr(s, sp)
=
Pr(s, sp|θ = 1)Pr(θ = 1)
Pr(s, sp|θ = 1)Pr(θ = 1) + Pr(s, sp|θ = 0)Pr(θ = 0)
=
αms(1−α)n−msβ1sp=1(1− β)1sp=0
αms(1−α)n−msβ1sp=1(1− β)1sp=0 + (1−α)msαn−ms(1− β)1sp=1β1sp=0
=
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)ms ( α
1−α
)n−ms (1−β
β
)1sp=1 ( β
1−β
)1sp=0 ,
where the first equality follows from Bayes rule and the third equality comes from the
independence assumption of the signals.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose all agents j , i play vj(sj , sp) = sj . First, note that if vi(1,0) = 1 is rational for
agent i, so is vi(1,1) = 1; similarly, if vi(0,1) = 0 is rational for agent i, so is vi(0,0) = 0.
Hence, we only need to consider the optimality of the informative voting strategy in the
cases where si , sp.
Secondly, note that agent i is only decisive when and only when there are k − 1 agents
who observe a positive signal (sj = 1) and each of the remaining n − k agents observes
an opposite signal (sj = 0). Hence, given si = 1, sp = 0 and being pivotal, the posterior
probability that agent i assigns to the event θ = 1 is:
pi01 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)k ( α
1−α
)n−k β
1−β
.
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Similarly, given si = 0, sp = 1 and being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i
assigns to the event θ = 1 is:
pi10 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)k−1 ( α
1−α
)n−k+1 1−β
β
.
To have informative voting as an equilibrium, it is both necessary and sufficient to have
∀i ∈ I , qi ∈ [pi10,pi01], i.e.,
∀i ∈ I , qi ∈
 11 + (1−αα )2k−n−2 1−ββ ,
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
 .
Proof of Corollary 1
Note that the interval [pi10,pi
0
1] as defined in the proof of Proposition 1 is non-empty if and
only if (1−α
α
)2k−n−2 1− β
β
≥
(1−α
α
)2k−n β
1− β ⇐⇒ α ≥ β.
Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose there exists a k-voting rule under which the informative voting equilibrium ex-
ists. According to Proposition 1, the preferences of agents i and j must satisfy
qi ,qj ∈
 11 + (1−αα )2k−n−2 1−ββ ,
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
 . (A.1)
Moreover, (A.1) and qi <
1
1+ α1−α
1−β
β
implies
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n−2 1−β
β
<
1
1 + α1−α
1−β
β
⇐⇒ k < n+ 1
2
. (A.2)
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Similarly, (A.1) and qj >
1
1+ 1−αα
β
1−β
implies
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k−n β
1−β
>
1
1 + 1−αα
β
1−β
⇐⇒ k > n+ 1
2
. (A.3)
Clearly, (A.2) and (A.3) cannot both be satisfied at the same time. Hence, we can conclude
that the informative voting equilibrium does not exist under any k-voting rule.
Proof of Proposition 2
If 1 < k < n, given all other agents j , i are simply obeying the public signal, agent i will
never be pivotal, thus playing v(si , sp) = sp for all (si , sp) is clearly a best response.
If k = n and β ≥ α, assuming all other agents j , i are voting obediently, agent i will be
pivotal whenever sp = 1. However, agent i cannot infer anything about the others’ private
signals conditional on her pivotality, because they are just obeying the public signal. Thus
agent i simply compares her private signal and the public signal and follows the one of
higher precision, as long as she is not too biased. Hence, the obedient voting equilibrium
exists if the preference profile satisfies
∀i ∈ I , qi ∈
 11 + 1−αα β1−β ,
1
1 + α1−α
1−β
β
 ,
where the left endpoint of the interval is agent i’s posterior of the event θ = 1 conditional
on si = 1 and sp = 0, and the right endpoint is her posterior conditional on si = 0 and
sp = 1. The proof for the case k = 1,β ≥ α is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose sp = 1. Under the stated contingent k-voting rule, the threshold value for choos-
ing d = 1 is k1. Assume all agents j , i are playing the informative voting strategy. Con-
ditional on being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i would assign to the event
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θ = 1 if si = 0 or si = 1 are, respectively:
pi10 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)k1−1 ( α
1−α
)n−k1+1 1−β
β
=
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 1−β
β
and
pi11 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)k1 ( α
1−α
)n−k1 1−β
β
=
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n 1−β
β
.
Now suppose sp = 0. Under the stated contingent k-voting rule, the threshold value
for choosing the decision d = 1 is k0. Assume all agents j , i are playing the informative
voting strategy. Conditional on being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i would
assign to the event θ = 1 if si = 0 or si = 1 are, respectively:
pi00 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 β
1−β
and pi01 =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n β
1−β
.
It is easy to see that the informative voting equilibrium exists if and only if ∀i ∈ I ,
qi ≥max{pi00,pi10} and qi ≤min{pi01,pi11}.
Proof of Corollary 3
For a contingent k-voting rule with the threshold value k(sp) = 1sp=1k1 + 1sp=0k0, it is
clear that Qα,k0,k1(β) is non-empty if and only if the interval in (5.2) is non-empty, i.e.,
max{pi00,pi10} ≤min{pi01,pi11}.
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Note that
max{pi00,pi10} = pi10⇐⇒
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 1−β
β
≥ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 β
1−β
⇐⇒ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 (1−α
α
)r ≥ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 ( α
1−α
)r
⇐⇒
(1−α
α
)2k1−n−2+r ≤ (1−α
α
)2k0−n−2−r
⇐⇒ k0 − k1 ≤ r,
min{pi01,pi11} = pi01⇐⇒
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n β
1−β
≤ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n 1−β
β
⇐⇒ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n ( α
1−α
)r ≤ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n (1−α
α
)r
⇐⇒ k0 − k1 ≤ r.
Therefore, for the case k0 − k1 ≤ r, the interval in (5.2) is non-empty if and only if
pi10 ≤ pi01⇐⇒
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n−2 (1−α
α
)r ≤ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n ( α
1−α
)r
⇐⇒ k0 − k1 ≥ r − 1.
Similarly, for the case k0 − k1 > r, the interval in (5.2) is non-empty if and only if
pi00 ≤ pi11⇐⇒
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k0−n−2 ( α
1−α
)r ≤ 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)2k1−n (1−α
α
)r
⇐⇒ k0 − k1 ≤ r + 1.
We can now conclude that Qα,k0,k1(β) is non-empty if and only if r −1 ≤ k0−k1 ≤ r + 1.
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Proof of Proposition 4
From the algorithm that we described in Section 5.2, we know that for a given preference
profile q, there exists a contingent k-voting rule that can sustain informative voting as an
equilibrium if and only if there exists a pair of integers k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n} that satisfies the
inequalities (pi01)
−1(q¯) ≤ k0 ≤ (pi00)−1(q) and (pi11)−1(q¯) ≤ k1 ≤ (pi10)−1(q). These four inverse
function are given as follows:
(pi00)
−1(q) = 1
2

ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ 2 + r
 , (pi01)−1(q¯) = 12
 ln
(1−q¯
q¯
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ r ,
(pi10)
−1(q) = 1
2

ln
(
1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ 2− r
 , (pi11)−1(q¯) = 12
 ln
(1−q¯
q¯
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n− r .
As a result, we have
(pi00)
−1(q)− (pi01)−1(q¯) =
ln
(
1−q
q
)
− ln
(1−q¯
q¯
)
2ln
(
1−α
α
) + 1,
(pi10)
−1(q)− (pi11)−1(q¯) =
ln
(
1−q
q
)
− ln
(1−q¯
q¯
)
2ln
(
1−α
α
) + 1.
If q < q¯, it is easy to check that both (pi00)
−1(q) − (pi01)−1(q¯) and (pi10)−1(q) − (pi11)−1(q¯) are
strictly less than one, which implies that both the interval [(pi01)
−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)] and the
interval [(pi11)
−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)] can contain at most one integer. If q = q¯ = q, then (pi00)−1(q)−
(pi01)
−1(q¯) = (pi10)−1(q)−(pi11)−1(q¯) = 1. Thus, in this case both the interval [(pi01)−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)]
and the interval [(pi11)
−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)] will contain at least one integer.5 Note that these re-
sults are independent of the size of the committee. Hence, it remains to be shown that
if ∀i ∈ I ,qi = q, then for each of these two intervals, at least one of the integers that are
contained in it must belong to the set {1, ...,n} when n is sufficiently large, so that the
5If (and only if) (pi01)
−1(q) is an integer, the interval [(pi01)−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)] will contain exactly two integers.
Similarly, there will be two integers in the interval [(pi11)
−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)] if and only if (pi11)−1(q) is an integer.
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corresponding contingent k-voting rule is well-defined. For this, it suffices to have
(pi11)
−1(q) ≥ 0⇐⇒ 1
2
 ln
(1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n− r ≥ 0
⇐⇒ n ≥ r −
ln
(1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
)
and
(pi00)
−1(q) ≤ n+ 1⇐⇒ 1
2
 ln
(1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ 2 + r ≤ n+ 1
⇐⇒ n ≥ r +
ln
(1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) ,
since (pi11)
−1(q) ≤ (pi01)−1(q) and (pi10)−1(q) ≤ (pi11)−1(q) for all q ∈ [0,1] and r ≥ 0. Let
n¯(q) =
max{r − ln
(1−q
q
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) , r + ln(1−qq )
ln
(
1−α
α
)}
+
,
where [x]+ denotes the smallest integer that is larger or equal to the real number x. We can
now conclude that when agents’ preference are perfectly aligned, there exists a threshold
value n¯(q), such that for each n ≥ n¯(q), there exists a contingent k-voting rule under which
the informative voting equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 5
Pick any qs from the sequence and let q¯s = maxj∈{1,...,n+s} qˆj and qs = minj∈{1,...,n+s} qˆj . From
the algorithm that we described in Section 5.2, we know that for such a preference profile,
there exists a contingent k-voting rule that can sustain informative voting as an equilib-
rium if and only if there exists a pair of integers ks0, k
s
1 ∈ {1, ...,n + s} that satisfies the
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inequalities (pi01)
−1
s (q¯
s) ≤ ks0 ≤ (pi00)−1s (qs) and (pi11)−1s (q¯s) ≤ ks1 ≤ (pi10)−1s (qs), where
(pi00)
−1
s (q
s) =
1
2

ln
(
1−qs
qs
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ s+ 2 + r
 , (pi01)−1s (q¯s) = 12
 ln
(1−q¯s
q¯s
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ s+ r ,
(pi10)
−1
s (q
s) =
1
2

ln
(
1−qs
qs
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ s+ 2− r
 , (pi11)−1s (q¯s) = 12
 ln
(1−q¯s
q¯s
)
ln
(
1−α
α
) +n+ s − r .
Because ln
(1−q
q
)
/ ln
(
1−α
α
)
is increasing in q and q¯ ≥ q¯s and q ≤ qs, comparing the above
four functions to the four functions (pi01)
−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q), (pi11)−1(q¯) and (pi10)−1(q) in the proof
of Proposition 4, it is clear that if there is a pair of integers k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n} that are respec-
tively contained in the intervals [(pi01)
−1(q¯), (pi00)−1(q)] and [(pi11)−1(q¯), (pi10)−1(q)], i.e., there
exists a contingent k-voting rule that can sustain informative voting as an equilibrium
with the preference profile q, there will be also a pair of integers ks0, k
s
1 ∈ {1, ...,n+s} that are
respectively contained in the intervals [(pi01)
−1
s (q¯
s), (pi00)
−1
s (q
s)] and [(pi11)
−1
s (q¯
s), (pi10)
−1
s (q
s)].
For asymptotic efficiency, note that ∀q ∈ (0,1), all (pi01)−1s (q)/(n + s), (pi00)−1s (q)/(n + s),
(pi11)
−1
s (q)/(n + s) and (pi
1
0)
−1(q)/(n + s) converge to 1/2 as s→∞. Hence, after adding suf-
ficiently many members to the committee, the probability that the collective decision
made in the informative voting equilibria under the corresponding contingent k-voting
rules coincide with that in the informative voting equilibrium under the standard major-
ity rule becomes arbitrarily close to 1. Since the informative voting equilibrium under the
standard majority rule is asymptotically efficient if the agents’ private signals are infor-
mative (α > 1/2), so are the informative voting equilibria under the contingent k-voting
rules.
Proof of Corollary 4
Plugging k0 = (n + 1)/2 + [(r − 1)/2]+ in the formulas of pi00 and pi01, one can easily verify
that for all r ≥ 0,
max{pi00,pi01} =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|−1 .
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Similarly, with k1 = (n+ 1)/2− [(r − 1)/2]+, we have
min{pi01,pi11} =
1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)−|r−2[(r−1)/2]+|+1
for all r ≥ 0. The result of the corollary thus immediately follows Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider a social planner who observes the whole vector of private signals s = (s1, ..., sn)
and the public signal sp. Suppose the public signal is r-times more informative than
the private signal, where r ≥ 0. Recall ms = ∑ni=1 si . To maximize the probability that
his decision will be matched to the state, the social planner would choose the following
optimal decision rule:
d∗ =

1 if ms − (n−ms) + r1sp=1 − r1sp=0 > 0,
{0,1} if ms − (n−ms) + r1sp=1 − r1sp=0 = 0,
0 if ms − (n−ms) + r1sp=1 − r1sp=0 < 0.
Under the contingent majority rule, k(sp) =
n+1
2 −
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 1 and k(sp) =
n+1
2 +
[
r−1
2
]+
if sp = 0. Hence, when sp = 1, in the informative voting equilibrium, d = 1 if and only if
ms ≥ n+ 12 −
[r − 1
2
]+
⇐⇒ (n−ms)−ms ≤ 2
[r − 1
2
]+
− 1 =: R1,
while when sp = 0, d = 1 if and only if
ms ≥ n+ 12 +
[r − 1
2
]+
⇐⇒ms − (n−ms) ≥ 2
[r − 1
2
]+
+ 1 =: R0.
There are four possible scenarios for the relative locations of r, [r]+, R1 and R0 on the
real line:
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1. r is an even integer,
rr − 2 r − 1 r + 1
R1 R0
2. r is an odd integer,
rr − 2 r − 1 r + 1
R1 R0
3. r is not an integer and [r]+ is even,
r − 1r − 2 r r + 1[r]+[r]+ − 1[r]+ − 2 [r]+ + 1
R1 R0
4. r is not an integer and [r]+ is odd,
r − 1r − 2 r r + 1[r]+[r]+ − 1[r]+ − 2 [r]+ + 1
R1 R0
Since |ms− (n−ms)| is odd, the above four figures jointly show that the collective deci-
sion achieved by the contingent majority rule always coincides with the social planner’s
choice.
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